BERLIN CLIMATE AND SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026

EVENT SUMMARY



© perskpektiv.berlin / adelphi

Berlin Climate and Security Conference 2026 Event Summary German Federal Foreign Office October 2026

Climate impacts, pressure on resources, geopolitical shifts and the erosion of multilateral norms are driving growing instability. At the same time, rising defence spending risks crowding out investment in climate resilience and sustainable development. The eighth Berlin Climate and Security Conference (BCSC) 2026, held under the theme "A climate for security, freedom and prosperity", explored how hard security, human security and climate action can be pursued together, reinforcing each other rather than competing. The conference highlighted the urgent need for integrated responses that work across sectors.

On 6 October, the climate security community convened at the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin and online to identify practical solutions to the defining climate security challenges of our time. Participants worked to integrate climate security risks into decision-making across sectors and levels of government, and to build coalitions that bridge diplomacy, defence and development.

To enable broad and global participation, all plenary sessions and many breakout sessions were livestreamed. Side events across Berlin on 5 and 7 October offered more opportunities for in-depth exchange. The full programme and conference recordings are available online.

The conference highlights

1. Climate change is increasingly framed as a driver of instability and economic risk. This opens doors, but global trends like rising defence expenditures and shrinking ODA risk crowding out investment in human security, climate resilience, peacebuilding and sustainable development. Making the case for climate ambition now means demonstrating the direct security and economic relevance of climate action and building partnerships across defence, diplomacy, humanitarian and peace actors, so that these agendas reinforce each other rather than compete.

2. The case for prevention is strong across every sector, yet funding, institutions and political incentives still reward reaction over anticipation. Moving from early warning to early action requires flexible anticipatory finance, data that decision-makers can use, and, above all, ways to value crises that never happen.

3. Those most exposed to climate risk still have the least say in how it is managed, yet they are often best placed to do so. Local authorities, women's networks, peacebuilders and civil society can see risks coming and keep action going when governments, peace processes or funding priorities shift. The bottleneck is not always the amount of funds, but access. Finance and programmes must be flexible enough to reach and work through the structures communities already trust.

4. Emerging technologies are rapidly becoming climate security issues in their own right, and effective governance is struggling to keep pace. AI's growing energy demand risks incentivising fossil fuel expansion in some markets and creates new financial risks for host countries, while AI tools make disinformation cheaper to produce and spread. Solar radiation modification, discussed at BCSC for the first time, raises the question of who controls the "global thermostat". Shaping the rules before these technologies scale is more practical than retrofitting governance afterwards.

BCSC 2026 plenary sessions examined how geopolitical pressure can turn climate ambition into strategic advantage for energy and defence, the economic case for investing in resilience in fragile and conflict-affected settings, climate-positive post-conflict reconstruction in Syria and how middle powers are driving climate security cooperation. Spotlight sessions explored heatwaves as a human security threat and the role of nature, biodiversity and climate as security assets.

Interactive breakout sessions addressed climate disinformation and AI, climate-induced fragility in areas affected by violent extremism and terrorism, the energy demands of AI and the just transition, the security and governance of solar radiation modification, and anticipatory humanitarian action. Further breakouts covered integrated climate, environment, peace and security programming through the Weathering Risk Peace Pillar, the "double cost crunch" facing climate and security investment, water shocks and cascading risks, inclusive and peaceful cities and climate security in the Arctic. The BCSC marketplace showcased initiatives and tools advancing the climate, peace and security agenda.

Official side events (5 and 7 October) included workshops on climate change and non-state armed groups, integrated climate, peace and security (CPS) programming from the Weathering Risk Peace Pillar, and water-related regional risks and cooperation pathways in Central Asia. Additional sessions examined how to finance land restoration and climate action in conflict-affected settings, learning from local leadership on climate action in conflict, and financing the green transition, with perspectives from Nigeria, Indonesia and India. See the Annex for the full list of panel discussions, breakout sessions and side events.

- 325+ in person participants
- 300+ online participants
- 68 speakers from around the world
- 37 partner organisations
- 16 sessions
- 10 official side events

Keynote by German Federal Foreign Minister, HE Dr Johann Wadephul

German Federal Foreign Minister Dr Johann Wadephul opened his keynote by arguing that crises do not need superlatives such as "Super El Niño" to give cause for concern. Extreme weather is already deepening crises and conflicts worldwide. In Sudan, failing rainfall and falling Nile water levels are intensifying drought in a country where the parties to the conflict deliberately use hunger and scarcity against the population. In Panama, low water levels have restricted traffic through the Canal, putting pressure on global supply chains. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is affecting fertiliser supply and energy prices. "Wherever war and crisis unfold, climate change will worsen them even further," he said.

Dr Wadephul noted that understanding of these global links has grown considerably since the first BCSC in 2019. However, words must now be followed by action.

> *Foreign policy, security policy and climate policy, as well as humanitarian assistance and economic development, must work together to strengthen resilience.*
>
> **HE Dr Johann Wadephul**
> Foreign Minister



© perskpektiv.berlin / adelphi

He stressed that stronger international cooperation is the only effective response, and that foreign, security, climate, humanitarian and development policies must work together. He outlined Germany's contributions, including the Weathering Risk initiative, its role in establishing the UN Climate Security Mechanism and co-chairing, with the Republic of Naoero, the UN Group of Friends on Climate and Security. He also pointed to cooperation with Kenya on the Nairobi Toolkit on Addressing the Nexus Between Climate Change and Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism.

> *We want to act together with foresight, rather than putting the pieces back together afterwards.*
>
> **HE Dr Johann Wadephul**
> Foreign Minister

Key takeaways

1. Climate and security agendas must reinforce one another and seek investments that serve both.

- **Geopolitical crises have acted as catalysts, not brakes.** Within weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU launched REPowerEU, a plan to end its dependence on Russian fossil fuels by saving energy, diversifying supplies and accelerating the rollout of renewables. It raised its ambition on renewables and efficiency instead of lowering it. When Russian oil and gas stopped in 2022, Finland also switched sources quickly, and 95 per cent of its electricity is now fossil free.
- **Climate security is no longer a niche field. As its scope broadens, questions of ownership emerge which must be addressed.** As coverage of climate security extends across ministries and institutions, from foreign affairs and defence to development and environment, the agenda has the opportunity to gain more champions and entry points for action, as long as coordination keeps efforts aligned.
- **Dual use technologies offers a bridge, but it must be demand driven.** Companies respond to clients, so governments must build climate resilience into defence tasking and procurement. With defence budgets rising and climate, food assistance and aid budgets shrinking, states are key to funding change at the scale needed.
- **Energy prices link climate to vulnerability and demonstrate the security case for climate action.** Price volatility shows that a fossil fuel-based economy is no longer a reliable path to prosperity, but increasingly a strategic liability. Investment in diversified, renewable energy infrastructure is investment in security.
- **Nature can be a strategic asset.** Finland's restoration of peatland along its eastern border delivers military protection, emission cuts and biodiversity gains at once. This is a concrete example of how to treat critical ecosystems as security infrastructure. Forests, wetlands, reefs and other ecosystems regulate water, protect coastlines, support food and energy production and reduce the economic impact of disasters. Protecting and restoring this natural infrastructure should therefore be recognised as a preventive security investment, rather than treated solely as environmental or development expenditure.

2. Climate risks cascade across borders and sectors, and addressing them requires a wider understanding of national vulnerability.

- **Food and water shocks travel**. Water infrastructure development in Afghanistan, an upstream state, could upend water-sharing arrangements across Central Asia. Drought and wildfires in Russia threatened Egypt's wheat imports and drove food price shocks in 2011; a decade on, Egypt had to raise the price of subsidised bread again after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted grain markets in 2022, the same structural vulnerability recurring under a new shock. Water and food are vulnerable to climate shocks abroad, and should not be treated merely as technical issues, but also as strategic foreign policy issues.
- **National risk assessments must look beyond national borders**. The UK's Nature security assessment on global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security, for instance, emphasises that the degradation of distant ecosystems such as the Amazon and Congo Basin directly threatens UK resilience and prosperity. Understanding national security therefore requires assessing dependencies on ecosystems and resources beyond national borders. This kind of analysis should be the norm, not the exception.
- **The value of nature remains invisible to markets**. Like systemically important banks, critical ecosystems underpin economic stability and national security, yet their true value remains largely invisible in risk assessments and investment decisions. Recognising the potentially irreversible costs of their collapse is essential to protecting them before it is too late.
- **The Arctic illustrates these dynamics.** In a region affected by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, melting sea ice allows for power projection and increases shipping risks, while thawing ground undermines military and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, changes in Arctic sea ice can influence weather patterns thousands of kilometres away, including monsoons in India. The example shows how regional environemental change can reshape local security dynamics and cascade far beyond the region.

3. Prevention pays, but systems still reward reaction.

- **Anticipatory action needs flexible, forecast-based funding and ready-to-deploy response mechanisms**. Funding should be able to trigger a response before disaster strikes, even amid the uncertainties inherent in forecasting. When risks can be anticipated and appropriate responses are known, action should not wait until impacts materialise. Funding released before a disaster unfolds is more likely to arrive in time.
- **Early warning must translate into early action**. In Kenya, chiefs trained in climate literacy monitor population and livestock movements, using existing local governance structures to identify emerging risks and facilitate mediation before conflict starts. Syria offers a similar opportunity in the making: the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management is developing a multi-hazard early warning system with neighbourhood-level risk mapping. Strengthening cross-ministerial coordination, data usability and funding could help translate these warnings into timely, coordinated action.
- **Heatwaves illustrate the cost of reactive systems**. Health systems are built for a climate that no longer exists, while the deadly impact of extreme heat stress often receives less attention than more visible disasters such as floods. Protecting vulnerable populations requires proactive cross-sectoral preparedness and response. Naming and categorising heatwaves by severity, as is done for storms, could help raise awareness and trigger earlier, more coordinated anticipatory action.
- **Make the value of prevention visible**: Decisionmakers struggle to put a value on avoided crises. Building avoided risk into budgets and investment decisions addresses this blind spot and encourages pre-emptive action.


© Sanyam Bajaj / adelphi

> *Money is available, the more pertinent question is who can access it?*
>
> **Gloria Womitso**
> African Risk Capacity

4. Closing the resilience finance gap requires more than mobilising capital. Finance must reach where it is needed.

- **The "double cost crunch" is already here**. Climate damages and transition costs are hitting public budgets at the same time, already squeezed by rising capital costs and competing development needs. Countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia and India illustrate this challenge. Despite pursuing policies ranging from energy subsidy reforms and green bonds to renewable energy and public transport investments, substantial financing gaps continue to constrain implementation.
- **Intermediaries are the missing middle**. Financial intermediaries can help connect small-scale investments to larger pools of capital by aggregating projects and making them more attractive to investors. Initiatives such as the European Investment Bank's Fragility Helpdesk can complement this role by supporting risk assessment and project design in fragile settings. Both approaches highlight the importance of strengthening domestic financial institutions capable of assessing risks, structuring investments and identifying viable projects.
- **Communities still need real agency over finance**. This entails providing money directly to local communities, involving them in deciding who receives it and having them define what climate security means in their own context. This issue continues to resurface, suggesting the problem isn't a lack of awareness but rather a lack of functional mechanisms.



> *Without effective, just governance, the alternative is that a few powerful countries get their hand on the global thermostat.*
>
> **Prof Aarti Gupta**
> Wageningen University and Research

5. Emerging technologies are concentrating power, creating new inequalities, and opening the door to new threats that governance is struggling to address.

- **The AI boom risks reproducing extractive patterns**. AI developers use whatever power is fastest and cheapest, including gas, and countries hosting data centres may take on new sovereign debt to build the grids they need. New demand must be met with additional renewable supply, sovereign guarantees for unsustainable debt must be avoided, and water use must be transparent.
- **Climate disinformation is growing more sophisticated, widespread and powerful**. Climate disinformation is increasingly used as a tool of information warfare by both state and non-state actors, and an increasing share of disinformation is designed to shape AI systems and the information environments they learn and generate responses from. Countering these threats requires a shift from debunking to pre-bunking, media literacy education and the full implementation of existing regulations, such as the EU's Digital Services Act.
- **Solar radiation modification raises questions of sovereignty and control**. Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), the most widley researched solar geoengineering technique, in which reflective particles are dispersed into the stratosphere, requires an advanced aerospace industry. Only around 10 to 12 states could do so currently, leaving the most climate vulnerable with no control over the technology. The African Group of Negotiators, within the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) supports an international non-use agreement, though others see research and norm-setting as a more viable path, as actors tempted to deploy might not respect a ban. Decisions on the use of the technology must be made with all affected parties, not just those who hold the technology.



© Sanyam Bajaj / adelphi

> *It is important to consider a broader scope of resilience because, for many individuals, joining an armed group was an act of resilience.*
>
> **Dr Siobhan O'Neil**
> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

6. Climate stress erodes livelihoods, trust and the social contract, opening space for extremism and unrest.

- **Climate shapes the choices and coping strategies that draw individuals to armed groups**. In Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, inadequate responses to extreme weather contributed to feelings of abandonment that extremist groups could exploit. UNIDIR research among former Boko Haram associates in the Lake Chad Basin similarly found that climate-related livelihood losses influenced some individuals' decisions to join armed groups. For some, as one former associate put it, joining was less a choice than the only way to access land or rebuild a life after climate shocks had taken everything else away.
- **Counterterrorism and reintegration must address climate-related grievances**: Counterterrorism and reintegration strategies that ignore climate stress, pollution and ecosystem degradation risk creating new grievances. Viable livelihoods and community early warning can help prevent grievances from deepening.
- **Cities can be flashpoints for unaddressed discontent**. Climate change erodes the safety, land tenure and social contract that displaced people need for durable solutions. When urban systems are overwhelmed by sudden arrivals of people, as seen in Port-au-Prince in Haiti, they can become unstable, contributing to violence.
- **Climate injustice can erode trust in institutions**. Heat, water stress and environmental degradation disproportionately affect already vulnerable communities, potentially reinforcing perceptions of inequality, exclusion and government neglect. These grievances can create fertile ground for disinformation and polarisation. Addressing climate and environmental injustice can therefore help rebuild trust between communities and the state.

> *Women are frequently the first to notice changes in radicalised behaviour. Women sustain social networks that communities rely on to resist shocks.*
>
> **Asha Abdikadir Omar**
> Horn of Africa Peace Network (HAPEN), Somalia

7. Lasting solutions build on structures that communities already trust.

- **Avoid parallel systems**: Existing authority works better than external frameworks. Communities already manage their own risks and hold complex knowledge Anticipatory action and early warning should strengthen existing mechanisms, including Indigenous knowledge, rather than replace them. For example, chiefs in Kenya trained in climate literacy can anticipate and address risks proactively, using their convening power so that mediation can happen before conflict breaks out, not after.
- **Local relationships make programmes adaptable**. The Weathering Risk Peace Pillar demonstrates how established relationships enable programmes to adapt when circumstances change. In Somalia, when political and security conditions made travel to programme areas unsafe, the team moved dialogue to safer locations and used radio programmes to continue to reach communities. In Yemen, the collapse of a national dialogue partner closed off national-level tracks, but years of relationship building allowed the team to revert towards community-level engagement rather than lose progress.
- **Climate and environmental cooperation can build peace, not just manage risk.** The Weathering Risk Peace Pillar show this in practice. In Nigeria's Middle Belt, three natural resource peace agreements, now benefiting over half a million people, helped resolve competition between farmers and herders with locally led committees that jointly manage land and water, embedded climate-smart agricultural practices, and reopened a market that violence had closed.
- **Women sustain the networks that help communities withstand shocks.** Women often play important roles in identifying emerging risks, maintaining social connections and mobilising community responses. In Somalia, they are often the first to notice radicalised behaviour changes. Women-led organisations should therefore be recognised and supported as leaders in prevention and response efforts, rather than engaged only as beneficiaries.

> *When floods hit, we have to shift from theoretical diplomacy to practical cooperation.*
>
> **Commodore Rafiu Taye Oladejo**
> National Counter Terrorism Centre, Nigeria

8. In a fragmented geopolitical landscape, delivering climate security requires institutions and partnerships that can outlast political and funding cycles.

- **Fragmentation undermines effective climate security action**. Many frameworks have been agreed, but initiatives operate in silos and compete with each other for funding that is under broad pressure globally. With aid to countries in need already declining, and further cuts likely, competition for funding may worsen. National level coordination between government ministries remains a persistent gap across national climate security planning. Better cooperation and integration are critical to make the best use of dwindling resources.
- **Uncomfortable partnerships are necessary**. Humanitarian actors called for working beyond traditional spheres, including with defence actors, and stressed that such partnerships must be reciprocal. For affected communities, divisions between humanitarian, development, peace and security actors can result in duplicated efforts, gaps in coverage and delayed responses when a crises cut across institutional mandates.
- **Lasting progress requires institutions that withstand political change**. In Brazil the administration weakened environmental protection policy, but the courts upheld already-codified protections when civil society organisations brought legal action to slow the pace of deforestation. This demonstrated the importance of civil society actors and that implementation of environmental policy is a responsibility of the state as a whole and should be built to endure beyond the administration of the day.
- **Middle powers and regional bodies are driving delivery**. Middle powers shape the climate security agenda by setting priorities and facilitating dialogue. Regional bodies are crucial to turning cooperation into practice. Strengthening their role can help sustain cooperation when broader multilateral processes face political deadlock.

Conclusions:

The eighth BCSC took place amid one of the most difficult geopolitical backdrops since the climate security agenda first gained traction. Multilateral norms are under strain, defence budgets are rising while aid and climate finance are being cut, and cooperation is competing for political attention and resources. However, this pressure is rewriting the logic behind the agenda rather than sidelining it. Energy security, economic resilience and defence readiness now drive action alongside environmental and humanitarian concerns. Progress is increasingly led by middle powers, regional bodies and local institutions, not only by Western capitals or UN headquarters.

Through the conference and its side events, BCSC worked to shape and coordinate the responses to these pressures. Climate risks cascade across borders, sectors and institutions, and the conference pushed for a broader understanding of the vulnerabilities and opportunities behind these risks, rather than treating them as someone else's problem. Finance exists but struggles to reach where it is needed. Technology is advancing faster than the rules meant to guide it. And in a landscape where climate, development, humanitarian and defence budgets often compete rather than reinforce each other, BCSC demonstrated, concretely, where these agendas gain more by working together than apart.

This is not a case for pessimism, but it raises the stakes. Fragmentation is not an abstract governance problem; it carries a direct cost in duplicated effort, uncovered gaps and responses that arrive too late. The institutions and partnerships that matter most going forward will be those built to outlast single administrations and funding cycles: grounded in local legitimacy, sustained by flexible finance, and willing to work with partners, including those outside the usual circle, that the scale of the challenge now demands.

Master of Ceremony, Swathi Veeravalli synthesised five calls to action: make prevention pay; turn climate risk into investable opportunity; put the environment into national security; look for dual-use investments; and consider naming heatwaves to trigger anticipatory action. In her closing remarks, Katharina Ahrendts, Director-General for Global Order, the United Nations and Humanitarian Assistance at the Federal Foreign Office, put it plainly: „climate and security are intertwined, and the question is no longer whether they belong together, but how fast institutions, finance and partnerships can catch up."

BERLIN CLIMATE AND SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026

Next Steps:

Regional and thematic conversations continue beyond Berlin. On 29 April 2026, BCSC-New York took the dialogue to the heart of multilateral diplomacy. Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, with support from adelphi global, it brought together more than 130 participants, more than 50 Member State delegations and 35 speakers to discuss how the UN system can integrate climate security into conflict prevention and sustaining peace. The insights from both convenings now carry into a dense calendar of international fora where the arguments made in Berlin need to be translated into decisions.

At COP31 in Antalya and the UN Water Conference in Abu Dhabi, climate security can still be anchored in the formal agenda, not solely in side events. At COP31, this means connecting the anticipatory finance and access agenda raised in Berlin to the adaptation finance discussions already under negotiation. At the Water Conference, it means carrying forward the case that water security is a strategic foreign policy issue, not only a technical one.

Looking further ahead, COP32 in Addis Ababa will be the first UN climate conference on the African continent since COP27. African governments, the African Union and regional bodies have been among the most consistent champions of integrating climate, peace and security into formal policy processes, and COP32 is an opportunity to carry that leadership further, giving African-led approaches to climate, peace and security a central role in shaping the formal COP32 agenda.

Thank you to all partner organisations and participants for keeping the conversation moving forward. For more insights, explore the hashtag #BCSC2026 on LinkedIn and Bluesky, and view additional articles, news coverage and takeaways here.



© Sanyam Bajaj / adelphi

Organised by: adelphi GLOBAL

Federal Foreign Office

Climate Diplomacy

BERLIN CLIMATE AND SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026

BCSC 2026 Agenda

6 October

- Conference Welcome and opening
- **Plenary 1:** Shrinking spaces, new levers: Turning climate adaptation into strategic advantage for energy and defence
- Keynote
- **Plenary 2:** The price of fragility: From climate risk to economic security and resilience
- Climate disinformation, AI and security
- Climate-induced fragility in areas affected by violent extremism and terrorism
- Energy security, AI, value chains and geopolitics
- Governing the sun? Global security and governance of Solar Radiation Modification
- Acting ahead: Can anticipatory humanitarian action reduce climate security risks?
- **Spotlight 1:** Health under heat: Heatwaves as a human security threat
- **Spotlight 2:** Rooted in resilience: Nature, biodiversity and climate as security assets
- **Plenary 3:** From rubble to resilience: The case for climate-positive post-conflict reconstruction in Syria
- The integration dividend: CEPS programming in practice
- The double cost crunch: Why climate investments are essential for security
- Water shocks, global consequences: Cascading risks in a changing climate
- Building inclusive and peaceful cities on the frontlines of climate change
- Melting ice, rising tensions: Climate change as a threat multiplier in the Arctic
- **Plenary 4:** The middle ground: How middle powers are driving climate security cooperation
- Closing remarks

BERLIN CLIMATE AND SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026

BCSC 2026 Agenda - Official Side Events

5 October

- A fragile balance: Climate change, non-state armed groups and security
- From analysis to implementation: Lessons on integrated CPS programming from the Weathering Risk Peace Pillar
- Climate, peace and security in Central Asia: A dialogue on water-related regional risks, practical entry points and cooperation pathways
- Prevention in a changing climate: Resource competition, resilience and terrorism through a gender lens
- Tools for ensuring resilience in climate security practice – What works for whom and why?
- Evidence to action: Closing the gap on climate security in crisis-affected transboundary contexts
- Speaker and partner reception

7 October

- Financing Land Restoration and Climate Action in Conflict-Affected Settings
- Climate action in conflict: Learning from local leadership
- Financing the Green Transition: Policy Instruments, Energy Security and Geopolitical Dimensions. Perspectives from Nigeria, Indonesia and India

Published by: adelphi global gemeinnützige GmbH © adelphi global, 2026 CC-BY ND 4.0

BERLIN CLIMATE AND SECURITY CONFERENCE 2026

Our partners:

Weathering Risk Peace Pillar

GCERF Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Climate Action Against Disinformation

Chatham House

Climate Change & Security NATO Centre of Excellence

XCEPT Cross-Border Conflict Evidence / Policy / Trends

PIK Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

FBA

CMC Finland

Berghof Foundation

Centre for Social and Economic Progress CSEP Independence | Integrity | Impact

European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management

United Nations System Staff College

DGAP

EfD Nigeria

WWF

Climate Centre

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz

Botschaft von Japan 在ドイツ日本国大使館

IESR

ESDC

International Rescue Committee

Federal Ministry for the Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety

Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency

FriEnt Working Group on Peace and Development

Federal Ministry of Defence

sipri

UNIDIR

zif Center for International Peace Operations

UNFPA

giz Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

ECCP Community of Practice environment, climate, conflict, and peace

United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism

Organised by: adelphi GLOBAL

Federal Foreign Office

Climate Diplomacy